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Abstract
In a homogeneous good, Cournot duopoly model, entry may occur even when the potential
entrant has no cost advantage and no independent access to distribution. By sinking its costs of
production before negotiating with the incumbents, the entrant creates an externality that induces
the incumbents to bid more aggressively for the distribution rights to its output. Each incumbent is
willing to pay up to the incremental proﬁt earned from the additional output plus the incremental
loss avoided by keeping the output away from its rival. This implies that the incumbents are
willing to pay up to the market price for each unit of available output. A sequential game in
which the incumbents produce ﬁrst is analyzed, and the conditions under which entry is deterred
by incumbents’ preemptive capacity expansions are derived.
KEYWORDS: Cournot duopoly, entry deterrence
We would like to thank Joseph Harrington, Albert Ma, Michael Whinston, and the anonymous
referees, as well as seminar participants at Northwestern University, for their helpful comments.1 Introduction
The major motion picture studios in the United States, including Disney, Time
Warner, and Paramount Pictures, are vertically integrated organizations. In addi-
tion to producing expensive Hollywood movies, these companies also own and
control distribution channels, cable networks, and television stations. It is not un-
common for small non-integrated ﬁlm companies to make movies without any ﬁ-
nancial support from major studios and then later auction them off for hefty sums
of money. In January of 2005, for example, Paramount/MTV ﬁlms purchased
the low-budget indie ﬁlm “Hustle & Flow”1 at the Sundance Film Festival.2 The
bidding war to acquire “Hustle” began during the premier of the ﬁlm on a Sat-
urday night and culminated on Sunday morning in a ﬁnal bid of $16 million.3
According to co-producer Stephanie Allain, “We started (‘Hustle’) in 2001, tak-
ing it to studios, and we couldn’t get it done....Because it is by an independent
ﬁlmmaker—not because it isn’t commercial, which it is.” Allain’s partner, John
Singleton, said, “Every studio and every distributor loved it....But they couldn’t
pull the trigger. We got frustrated and said, ‘We’re just going to make it.’”4
This paper is about the difﬁculties that entrants face when their competitors
are vertically integrated and control access to distribution (or another critical re-
source). Although entry is certainly difﬁcult when distribution is controlled by
incumbents, we show that entry is facilitated when distribution is more compet-
itive. By strategically sinking costs of production or capacity, the entrant can
stimulate competition between the vertically integrated incumbents. As in the
example of the bidding war for the indie ﬁlm “Hustle & Flow” at the Sundance
Film Festival, the ability of an entrant to capture rents may be enhanced after
its costs have already been sunk. We show that this can be true even when the
incumbent ﬁrms are forward-looking and can expand their own production levels
to preempt entry.
1“Hustle” tells the story of an anti-hero, a pimp from Memphis, Tennessee, who is in the midst
of a mid-life crisis and is struggling to become a rapper.
2The festival, which began in 1978, is one of the most prestigious ﬁlm festivals in the world
and is held annually in Utah. The festival, which showcases the work of independent ﬁlmmakers,
beneﬁted from the early involvement and support of actor Robert Redford. It also borrows its
name from Redford’s character in “Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid.”
3This was the largest deal in Sundance history. The deal also included two additional unspec-
iﬁed movies from the same ﬁlmmakers. John Beifuss Scripps, “$16 Million Deal is Sundance
Record,” Deseret Morning News, January 25, 2005. Other high-priced deals negotiated at Sun-
dance include “The Spitﬁre Grill” for $10 million, “Napoleon Dynamite” for $3 million, and
“Little Miss Sunshine” for $10.5 million. See also Kate Kelly, “The Sun Rises at Sundance,” The
Wall Street Journal, January 27, 2005.
4Todd McCarthy, “Par Execs ‘Hustle’ for Hot Pic; Studio Makes $16 Mil Deal with Single-
ton,” Daily Variety, January 23, 2005.
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grated Cournot duopolists face the threat of upstream entry. The product is ho-
mogeneous; the entrant is no more efﬁcient than the incumbents and does not
beneﬁt from product differentiation of any kind.5 If the duopolists naively ignore
the threat of entry and produce the Cournot duopoly outcomes, the entrant could
enter the market and earn positive proﬁts. To see why, suppose that the entrant
did in fact sink the cost of producing a small amount of an additional upstream
output. Since the entrant’s output will be sold by one ﬁrm or the other, each ﬁrm
correctly ignores the impact of the extra output on the price of its inframarginal
production (the price will decrease by the same amount regardless of who buys
the entrant’s output). This implies that the marginal revenue of the entrant’s ex-
tra output is equal to the market price and that the entrant would produce as if it
had access to distribution.6 To make the analogy to the Sundance Film Festival
example, the movie studios were willing to pay a hefty sum to acquire “Hustle”
after it had already been produced ex post, even though they would not have been
willing to do so ex ante.
The Cournot duopolists are not naive in our model, however, and they can
adjust their own capacity to deter entry. In particular, we show that when the cost
of upstream production is sufﬁciently small, the incumbents will deter entry by
symmetrically expanding their output. For an intermediate range of costs, entry
is still deterred, but one incumbent produces more than the other. For a high
range of costs, entry is accommodated, and the ﬁrms’ outputs are the same as
they would have been if the entrant had independent access to distribution. We
also show that these ranges are not mutually exclusive. The intermediate and
high ranges overlap, so both entry-deterring and entry-accommodating equilibria
exist simultaneously for some parameter values.
It is interesting to note that the incumbents are harmed by their inability to
commit not to deal with the entrant. The incumbents compete for the right to
distribute the entrant’s output, even though the new output will reduce the mar-
gin on their existing products. The incumbents would be better off if they could
collectively refuse to deal with the entrant or could otherwise restrict the en-
trant’s access to distribution. Furthermore, the incumbents also fail to coordi-
nate their entry deterrence strategies. Interestingly, this leads to over-deterrence.
For some parameter values, entry deterrence occurs even though the incumbents’
joint proﬁts would have been higher if they had accommodated entry. This hap-
pens because the entry-deterring equilibrium is asymmetric, and the larger ﬁrm
5Many of the real-world examples that we use as motivation involve differentiated products.
Differentiation is discussed in more detail in the Conclusion.
6Molnar (2000) considers a model of horizontal mergers where incentives to merge are shaped
by similar negative externalities.
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We believe that these issues are of broad interest and importance. There
are many industries besides the movie industry where distribution is controlled
by a small number of vertically integrated ﬁrms, and entrants must rely upon
one of their rivals to distribute its product. Small drug producers often rely
upon large, vertically integrated pharmaceutical companies to market and dis-
tribute their products; small airlines (such as Spirit Airlines at O’Hare airport in
Chicago) have successfully entered markets where a few dominant ﬁrms control
access to terminal gates and baggage carousels.7 Furthermore, in many of these
cases, the incumbent ﬁrms have expanded and/or diversiﬁed in light of upstream
competition. Continental and United Airlines, for example, have expanded their
offerings to include point-to-point service to compete with entrants like South-
west. In the last decade, most of the major motion picture studios have developed
business units that focus on the production of “specialty” ﬁlms. Interestingly, spe-
cialty ﬁlm divisions were responsible for most of the best-picture nominees at the
Academy Awards in 2005.8
Our paper contributes to the game theoretic literature on entry deterrence be-
gun by Spence (1977) and Dixit (1980). They show that by building extra ca-
pacity, incumbents can credibly commit to respond aggressively to new entry.
Because the cost of capacity is sunk, the threat to lower price if entry occurs is
credible. In our paper, incumbents make Spence-Dixit-style capacity commit-
ments even though the entrant cannot sell its output directly to consumers. The
incumbents need to make capacity commitments in order to make it credible that
neither ﬁrm will buy the entrant’s capacity.
Gilbert and Vives (1986) and Waldman (1987) extend this literature to con-
sider multiple incumbents. They examine the hypothesis that non-cooperative
oligopolists free ride on their rivals’ entry deterrence with the result that total en-
try deterrence is diminished relative to cooperating ﬁrms. Gilbert and Vives argue
against this hypothesis citing other offsetting effects while Waldman argues that,
7Ben & Jerry’s, the second-largest producer of superpremium ice cream in the U.S., recently
began distributing its ice cream through Pillsbury, maker of the leading superpremium ice cream
brand, H¨ agen-Dazs. Ben and Jerry’s announced the switch after a dispute with its former dis-
tributor, Dreyer’s, a premium-brand ice cream producer who had announced plans to enter the
superpremium ice cream market. International markets offer many more examples. U.S. mutual
fund providers Citibank and Salomon Smith Barney distribute their products in Japan through
vertically integrated competitors. Quaker’s Gatorade beverages and Anheuser-Busch’s beers are
also distributed by rivals in Japan.
8These divisions include Disney’s Miramax business unit, NBC Universal’s Focus Features,
Paramount’s Paramount Classics, and Time Warner’s Warner Independent. Kate Kelly and
Merissa Marr, “Time Warner Joins ‘Indie’ Film Company with HBO, New Line,” Wall Street
Journal, March 24, 2005.
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different and includes no uncertainty, we demonstrate that, under some condi-
tions, our incumbents would be strictly better off if they agreed to accommodate
entry.
Rasmusen (1988) extends the Spence-Dixit models by allowing the incum-
bentto“buyout”theverticallyintegratedentrant. HeshowsthattheSpence-Dixit
result is only valid if the incumbent can commit not to acquire the entrant. In his
model the incumbent always ﬁnds it proﬁtable to buy the entrant when entry oc-
curs (entry doesn’t occur unless a buyout is going to occur). So, the entrant’s
decision to enter depends not on the entrant’s expected proﬁts from producing
(though it must be credible for the entrant to stay in the market after sinking its
entry costs if it is not acquired) but on how much the incumbent is willing to pay
to acquire it. And this in turn depends on how big an impact the entrant has on
the incumbent’s proﬁts. But Rasmusen’s model is fundamentally different from
ours because the entrant’s outside option is to sell his output himself. Rasmusen
argues that entry for buyout is less likely in imperfectly competitive markets be-
cause buyout becomes a public good. In contrast, in our model the entrant cannot
harm a monopoly incumbent, so buyout is more likely in imperfectly competitive
markets.
Our paper is also related to the literature on the persistence of monopoly.
Gilbert and Newbery (1982) showed that new capacity is more valuable to an in-
cumbent than it is to a new entrant, so monopolists tend to persist. In our model,
duopoly in distribution persists by construction. The entrant’s value of capacity
is only equal to what it can get by selling it to the incumbents. Nevertheless, we
show that for sufﬁciently low capacity cost the incumbents overproduce to pre-
empt entry in production as well. Krishna (1993) extends Gilbert and Newbery to
the case where new capacity becomes available sequentially. Krishna shows that
the persistence of monopoly depends on the timing of the arrival of new capacity.
In an oligopoly context, Eso, Nocke, and White (2006) show that sequential ca-
pacity auctions for exogenously given capacity can explain equilibrium asymme-
tries in ﬁrm size among otherwise identical ﬁrms. Other related papers include
Kamien and Zang (1990), Reinganum (1983), Lewis (1983), Chen (2000), and
Hoppe, Jehiel, and Moldavanu (2006).
Finally, while we do not formally consider the decision of ﬁrms to merge
vertically, our paper suggests that competition severely limits upstream ﬁrms’
ability to use downstream foreclosure to limit upstream entry. Hence, it is related
to the literature on the anticompetitive effects of vertical mergers (see Salop and
Scheffman, 1987, Salinger, 1988, Ordover, Saloner, and Salop, 1990, Hart and
Tirole, 1990 and Chen, 2001).
The next section lays out the basic framework for analysis, describes the tim-
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examples that are useful for understanding our results. The body of the paper
characterizes the equilibrium and evaluates its social welfare implications. The
ﬁnal section discusses alternative timings and offers some concluding remarks.
2 The Model
There are three ﬁrms: A, B, and C. Firms A and B are the incumbents, and Firm
C is the entrant. The entrant differs from the incumbents in two important ways.
First, the incumbents, Firms A and B, have access to distribution while Firm C
does not.9 This implies that Firm C can only proﬁtably enter if it subsequently
sells its output to Firms A or B. Second, Firms A and B make their production (or
capacity) decisions before Firm C. Hence, we sometimes refer to Firms A and B
as “Stackelberg incumbents”.
We assume that production has a constant marginal cost k > 0 for each ﬁrm
and that distribution is costless for Firms A and B (and inﬁnitely costly for Firm
C). For simplicity we assume the market demand is p(z) = 1 z, where z is the
total amount of output that is distributed to the market by Firms A and B. While
our demand assumption is restrictive, it is clear that our results generalize easily
to any linear demand function.
Figure 1: The Timing
The timing of the game is as follows (see also Figure 1). First, in Stage 1, the
incumbents, Firms A and B, decide simultaneously and non-cooperatively how
9This assumption can be motivated in different ways. The simplest motivation is economies
of scale in distribution (perhaps spread over multiple products) that blockade the entrant from
the distribution market. Another is that the incumbents have brand names that they use to solve
a quality-assurance problem with consumers, so the entrant cannot proﬁtably sell to consumers
unless it sells the product under an incumbent’s brand name. If we assume additionally that
the incumbents can only monitor the entrant’s quality when they control the distribution of the
entrant’s product, then the entrant’s only option is to distribute through the incumbents.
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to produce, xC. Then, in Stage 3, after all three ﬁrms have chosen their outputs,
Firm C sells its output as a block to the incumbent ﬁrms.
Assumption 1 The entrant’s output is sold to the incumbents, as a block, in a
ﬁrst-price auction.
If Firm i purchases Firm C’s output, then the incumbents’ interim output en-
dowments are yi = xi+xC and y i = x i, and if neither ﬁrm purchases from the
entrant, then yi = xi;8i. Finally, in Stage 4, each incumbent decides simultane-
ously and non-cooperatively how much output to distribute to the ﬁnal market,
zi  yi, and the equilibrium market price is determined.
This is a sequential game of complete information, and we solve for the sub-
game perfect Nash equilibrium (or equilibria) of the game.
Interpretation
While this is a static model, it is reasonable to think of the initial production
levels, xA;xB; and xC, as representing one-time capacity decisions and the in-
cumbents’ distribution choices, zA and zB, as representing the ﬁrms’ subsequent
production decisions subject to capacity constraints. The entrant’s sale, xC, may
involve either a one-time transfer of capacity, i.e., a merger or an acquisition, or
the repeated sale of output, i.e., an ongoing contractual relationship to provide
distribution and resale. This interpretation of the model is valid as long as the
capacity costs are sufﬁciently large relative to the variable costs of production
(which are zero in this interpretation of our model).
In addition, access to distribution can be interpreted as any essential comple-
mentary resource. Formally, distribution serves two roles in the paper. First, only
a ﬁrm with access to distribution can sell to consumers. And second, output can
be disposed of freely at the distribution stage. So, any other essential comple-
mentary resource, such as a proprietary network or regulatory restrictions, can
take the place of distribution as long the free disposal option remains.
Notation
Here we describe some additional basic notation that will be used throughout the
paper. Let pi(zi;z i) = zip(zi +z i) denote incumbent i’s continuation proﬁt
as a function of the ﬁnal distribution levels. Let z
i (yi;y i) denote incumbent
i’s equilibrium distribution level as a function of the interim endowments. Let
Pi(yi;y i) = pi(z
i (yi;y i);z
 i(yi;y i)) denote incumbent i’s continuation proﬁt
as a function of the interim endowments.
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the other ﬁrm’s output and of Firm i’s own unit cost c (in our analysis, c will take
on the values k and 0). In other words,
R(x i;c) = argmax
xi
xip(xi+x i) cxi:
Because we assume that demand is linear, this simpliﬁes to R(x i;c) =
1 x i c
2 .
We deﬁne xc
0 to be the Cournot duopolist’s output when both ﬁrms have zero
costs, so xc
0 is deﬁned by
(1) xc
0 = R(xc
0;0):
With a linear demand function, this reduces to xc
0 = 1
3. Similarly, we deﬁne xc
k to
be the Cournot duopolist’s output when both ﬁrms have costs k, so xc
k is deﬁned
by
xc
k = R(xc
k;k);
and because we assume that demand is linear, xc
k = 1 k
3 . We deﬁne xs
k;0 to be the
Stackelberg leader’s output when the leader has cost k and the follower has zero
cost, so
(2) xs
k;0 = argmax
xA
xAp(xA+R(xA;0)) kxA;
and because we assume that demand is linear, xs
k;0 = 1
2  k.
Finally, let r(x i) denote incumbent i’s best response function with respect to
the other incumbent’s output when the entrant is expected to subsequently enter
and produce as an integrated Stackelberg follower, i.e., R(xi+x i;k). So,
r(x i) = argmax
xi
xip(xi+x i+R(xi+x i;k)) kxi:
Because we assume that demand is linear, this simpliﬁes to r(x i) =
1 x i k
2 .
Notice that the Stackelberg incumbents produce the same outputs here as they
would absent the threat of (vertically integrated) entry.
3 Benchmarks
In this section, we consider several benchmark models with alternative market
structures. These examples are important for developing intuition for the model
and for understanding the scope of our results. The four market structures that
we discuss, our three benchmarks models, and our main model are all shown in
Figure 2.
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Market Structure I: One Incumbent and One Entrant With Access
This benchmark is simply the well-known Stackelberg Leader/Stackelberg fol-
lower case.
Lemma 1 When there is a single incumbent and the entrant has access to dis-
tribution, the incumbent produces 1 k
2 , the entrant produces 1 k
4 , and the market
price is 1+3k
4 .
Market Structure II: One Incumbent and One Entrant Without Access
Another benchmark is a single monopoly incumbent and an entrant that has no
access to distribution. In this case, it is easy to see that the single Stackelberg in-
cumbent can extract full monopoly rents by simply producing and distributing the
monopoly output itself. When the incumbent produces the monopoly output, the
marginal revenue associated with producing and distributing one additional unit
is exactly equal the marginal cost, k. If the entrant produced any additional out-
put, implying that the total level of production is above the monopoly level, then
the incumbent’s marginal willingness to pay would be less than k per unit. So,
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the entrant cannot expect to receive a price that exceeds his cost of production,
and entry is never proﬁtable.
Lemma 2 When there is a single incumbent, and the entrant does not have ac-
cess to distribution, the incumbent produces 1 k
2 , the entrant produces 0, and the
market price is 1+k
2 .
While it is self-evident that the monopolist will never purchase from the en-
trant and that the entrant will never produce, we emphasize this result because
it contrasts starkly with our results for two incumbents and an entrant without
access to distribution (Market Structure IV).
Market Structure III: Two Incumbents and One Entrant With Access
Our next benchmark is the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game under the
assumption that the entrant does have access to distribution.
Lemma 3 When all three ﬁrms have access to distribution, the unique equilib-
rium outputs are
1 k
3 ; 1 k
3 ; 1 k
6
	
, so the total industry output is xA+xB+xC is
5 5k
6 , and the associated market price is p = 1+5k
6 .
Proof: See Appendix.
NotethatwhenFirmChasaccesstodistribution, theequilibriumisstillasym-
metric because Firms A and B are able to choose their capacities ﬁrst. Later, we
will see that this equilibrium may also be the unique equilibrium of the game
even when Firm C does not have access to distribution.
Market Structure IV: Two Incumbents and One Entrant Without Access
Market Structure IV is the case analyzed in the remainder of the paper. Before
characterizingtheequilibriaofthisgame, itisusefultoillustratewhytheoutcome
of this game differs dramatically from the unique equilibrium outcome in Market
Structure II.
Suppose that the entrant has no independent access to distribution and that
the incumbents each produce xc
k = 1 k
3 , their Cournot outputs. In other words,
suppose that, as in Market Structure II, the incumbents do not expect the entrant
to produce because it has no access to distribution. In this case, the market price
is 1+2k
3 , which is strictly greater than k: As long as the entrant does not enter,
the incumbents earn positive proﬁt margins producing and selling their Cournot
outputs.
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cess to distribution. If the incumbents each na¨ ıvely produce the Cournot duopoly
output, then the entrant will produce the same output as in Market Structure III
and will distribute through the incumbent ﬁrms.
To see this, suppose that the entrant, lacking direct access to distribution, pro-
duces a small amount D and attempts to auction this output to the two incumbents.
If Firm A wins the auction then Firm A will distribute the additional output, and
the market price will fall (ever so slightly) below 1+2k
3 : If Firm B wins the auc-
tion, Firm B will distribute the additional output as well, and the market price will
fall to the same level. Since the market price for the additional output is slightly
below 1+2k
3 regardless of who wins, each incumbent is willing to pay slightly
below 1+2k
3 per unit for the entrant’s output.
The negative externality in the auction between the two incumbents allows the
entrant to extract the full market price for its additional output. So, the entrant’s
output is sold at the market price to the incumbents, and the entrant’s proﬁts are
the same as if it sold directly to consumers. And this is true regardless of how
much the entrant produces as long as the implied market price is greater than k.
Interestingly, the incumbents would be better off if they could collectively
refuse to deal with the entrant. First, the entrant has forced them to sell beyond
their Cournot duopoly output. Second, the entrant has induced them to pay a
premium for this output, since the price paid in the auction is above the marginal
cost of k. If the two incumbents could jointly commit not to participate in the
auction, then the entrant would have no outlet for its output, and the two incum-
bents would be jointly better off. In fact, both incumbents would be better off
if even just one of them made an ex ante unilateral commitment not to buy the
entrant’s output.
In the rest of the paper, we explore how the incumbents can, in effect, com-
mit not to trade with the entrant by increasing their Stage 1 production, and we
ask under what circumstances the incumbents will accommodate entry and under
what circumstances they will produce enough to deter entry.
4 Stage 4: The Distribution Decisions
Suppose that Firms A and B have output endowments of yA and yB at the begin-
ning of the Stage 4 distribution subgame. How much of these endowments will
they sell, or distribute, to the ﬁnal market?
Firm A and, by analogy, Firm B will choose their distribution to maximize
their continuation proﬁts, zAp(zA+zB), subject to zA  yA. So, it follows that
10
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with zero costs deﬁned above, and more generally:
Lemma 5 Given interim endowments yA and yB, Firms A and B’s distribution
levels, z
A(yA;yB) and z
B(yA;yB), uniquely solve zA =minfR(zB;0);yAg and zB =
minfR(zA;0);yBg.
Figure 3 depicts each of the equilibrium distribution levels, z
A(yA;yB) and
z
B(yA;yB), as functions of the ﬁrms’ interim output endowments, yA and yB. The
dashed lines represent the production best-response curves, R(x i;k). The solid
lines represent the distribution best-response curves, R(x i;0).
Figure 3: The Distribution Decisions
Within the shaded area of Figure 3, z
A = yA and z
B = yB. In other words, both
incumbents would distribute and sell additional output if they had it. This is par-
ticularly important for our purposes. Intuitively, both ﬁrms’ interim endowments
satisfy yi  R(y i;0)8i, so the marginal revenue from selling a unit of output is
strictly positive for both ﬁrms regardless of what the other ﬁrm distributes. So,
in the shaded area the incumbents will distribute all of their output. Whenever
both incumbents prefer to distribute additional output, as opposed to withholding
11
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market clearing price.
When one or both of the ﬁrms’ interim endowments are greater than their
distribution best responses, that is, yi >R(y i;0) for some i (so we are outside the
shaded region), then at least one ﬁrm will withhold some output from the market.
Moreover, the ﬁrm with more output will always withhold more. Intuitively, the
larger ﬁrm has more to gain from withholding some of the production from the
market because it beneﬁts more from an increase in the market price.
This is easy to see when only one ﬁrm’s interim endowment is greater than its
distributionbestresponse. WhenonlyFirmA’sinterimendowmentisgreaterthan
its distribution (or zero-cost) best-response, then in the distribution stage Firm B
has an incentive to distribute all its output regardless of Firm A’s distribution, and
only Firm A will withhold output from the market: zA = R(yB;0) and zB = yB.
Similarly, if only Firm B’s interim endowment is greater than its distribution best
response, then in the distribution stage Firm A has an incentive to distribute all its
output regardless of Firm B’s distribution, and only Firm B will withhold output
from the market: zB = R(yA;0) and zA = yA.
When both of the ﬁrms’ interim endowments are greater than their distribu-
tion best responses, yi > R(y i;0);8i, then which ﬁrm withholds output from the
market depends on whether or not yi > xc
0. Intuitively, the larger ﬁrm has more
incentive to withhold output, so it reduces its output until either it is no longer the
larger ﬁrm, or the distribution levels reach the boundary of the shaded region.
The fact that the larger ﬁrm has a weakly greater incentive to withhold output
is important for understanding the auction that we consider in Stage 3.
5 Stage 3: The Auction
This section analyzes the outcome of the auction at Stage 3. Since this is a
game of complete information, a ﬁrst-price auction clearly implies that the in-
cumbent who values the entrant’s output more acquires the output and that the
price paid is equal to the valuation of the other incumbent.10 But which ﬁrm will
acquire the entrant’s output, and for how much? Recall that Pi(yi;y i) denoted
Firm i’s continuation proﬁt as a function of the interim endowments. Therefore,
in the auction, Firm A’s valuation (or the most the ﬁrm is willing to pay for the
block of output) is PA(xA+xC;xB) PA(xA;xB+xC), and Firm B’s valuation is
10This is the unique outcome of a ﬁrst-price auction and an equilibrium outcome of a second-
price auction. However, it is also the equilibrium outcome of a variety of multi-player bargaining
games.
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mum of these two valuations.
Intuitively, ifboth ﬁrms woulddistribute all of theentrant’s output conditional
on winning the auction, then both ﬁrms’ valuations are equal to xCp(xA+xB+xC)
and thus the same. So, if (xA;xB) lies in the interior of the shaded region in Figure
3, then both incumbents value the entrant’s output at the market price. If the
entrant produces a small amount, it can sell its output to the incumbents at the
market price.
However, if either ﬁrm has an incentive to withhold any of the entrant’s output
from the market, then the ﬁrm that produces more output initially internalizes
more of the gains from withholding output and therefore withholds more output
conditional on winning the auction. In other words, the larger ﬁrm values the
entrant’s output more than the smaller ﬁrm. This implies the following:
Lemma 6 Without loss of generality, let xA  xB. Then Firm A values the en-
trant’s output, xC, at least as much as Firm B, that is,
PA(xA+xC;xB) PA(xA;xB+xC)  PB(xA;xB+xC) PB(xA+xC;xB):
When this inequality is strict, Firm A wins the auction.11 Otherwise, equilib-
ria exist in which either ﬁrm wins the auction. But in either case, the equilib-
rium price paid for Firm C’s output is Firm B’s valuation, or PB(xA;xB+xC) 
PB(xA+xC;xB)g.
Proof: See Appendix.
The following assumption simpliﬁes the proofs and the exposition but is not
required for the results:
Assumption 2 When the ﬁrms’ valuations are the same and the auction has mul-
tiple equilibria, we select the equilibrium in which the larger incumbent wins the
auction.
Lemmas 5 and 6 imply that, as long as xB +xC < xc
0, Firm B’s valuation
(and hence the entrant’s revenue) will be xCp(xA +xB +xC). So, unless each
incumbents’ output is sufﬁciently large to begin with, the entrant will be able to
produce and sell at the market price.
The intuition for almost all of our results can easily be seen at this point. As
described earlier, if the incumbents produce in the interior of the shaded region
11Since the larger ﬁrm always values additional output more than the smaller ﬁrm, the assump-
tion that the entrant’s output is sold as a block does not seem particularly restrictive.
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It is as if the entrant had access to distribution. So, a candidate equilibrium in the
interior of the shaded region is an equilibrium in which entry is accommodated,
and the outputs are the same as the equilibrium outputs in Market Structure III
in which the entrant has access to distribution, f1 k
3 ; 1 k
3 ; 1 k
6 g: The incumbents
accommodate entry but have a ﬁrst-mover advantage.
Alternatively, the incumbents might produce at the boundary of the shaded
region and deter entry. Indeed, given any candidate equilibrium in the shaded
region of Figure 3, each ﬁrm could unilaterally move to the boundary. When the
costs of capacity k are very low, it shouldn’t be surprising that all of the equilibria
will be at the boundary. But when the costs are very high, the only equilibrium is
the entry-accommodating equilibrium; the entrant produces its best response to
the incumbents’ output and distributes its output through one of the incumbents.
Characterizing the equilibria is, in fact, more subtle than the simple intuition
above suggests. Most importantly, the entrant will only enter if the market price
is greater than k, so being in the interior shaded region is not sufﬁcient for entry
to take place. Second, if the incumbents’ interim endowments are sufﬁciently
asymmetric, entry will take place even if the endowment point lies on, or outside,
the boundary of the shaded area. These two issues complicate the analysis and,
as a consequence, hide some of the intuition of the paper. They are also the main
reason we were unable to generalize the model beyond linear demand. In the next
section of the paper, we carefully analyze the entrant’s production decision.12
6 Stage 2: The Entrant’s Production Decision
When xA  xB, the entrant’s revenue is PB(xA;xB +xC) PB(xA +xC;xB)g, the
proﬁt that Firm B earns when it acquires the entrant’s output less the proﬁt it
earns when Firm A acquires the entrant’s output. Clearly, entry will take place if
and only if PB(xA;xB+xC) PB(xA+xC;xB)g kxC > 0 for some xC > 0. The
following lemma characterizes the conditions under which entry will take place:
Lemma 7 Entry will occur if and only if (xA;xB) satisﬁes one of the following
conditions:
1. xA < R(xB;0), xB < R(xA;0), and p(xA+xB) > k (Region A);
2. xA  R(xB;0) and xB < min
n
xs
k;0;xc
0
o
 R(xA;0) (Region D1);
12The ﬁnal step will be to characterize which points on the boundary of the shaded region are
equilibria of the ﬁrst-stage game. This is done in Section 7 of the paper.
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n
xs
k;0;xc
0
o
 R(xB;0) (Region D2).
Proof: See the more general statement of this result (Lemma 8) and its proof
in the Appendix.
Lemma 7 is described in Figures 4, 5, and 6.
Figure 4: Regions in Which Entry Occurs: xs
k;0 > xc
0, or k  1
6
The three ﬁgures differ in the level of costs, k. Recall that in Figure 3, the
shaded area depicted the region in which both incumbents placed value on incre-
mental output, and as a consequence Firm C could enter and sell its output to the
incumbents at the market price. The shaded area in Figures 4, 5, and 6 depicts the
same region except that we impose the additional restriction that p > k, implying
that some degree of entry is proﬁtable. Figure 4 depicts the case in which costs
are in the lowest range (that is, low enough to imply xs
k;0  xc
0). Figure 5 depicts
the case in which costs are in an intermediate range (the costs are high enough
that xs
k;0 < xc
0 but still low enough to imply p
 
xc
0+xc
0

> k). Figure 6 depicts
the case where costs are in the highest range (in particular, p
 
2xc
0

< k so the
proﬁtability constraint binds in condition 1 of the lemma).
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k;0 < xc
0 and p(xc
0+xc
0) > k,
or k 2
 1
6; 1
3

Lemma 7 states that if the incumbents’ production levels, xA and xB, are both
greater than or equal to xc
0, then Firm C cannot proﬁtably enter. This is quite
intuitive. By Lemma 5, neither ﬁrm would distribute any of the entrant’s output
if they acquired it, so neither ﬁrm would be willing to pay anything for it. Neither
ﬁrm receives any direct value from the additional output and, just as important,
there is no value in keeping the output away from the rival incumbent. It follows
that if xA  xc
0 and xB  xc
0 then Firm C will not produce.
At the other extreme, if the incumbent’s production levels, xA and xB, lie
inside the distribution best-response functions, then the entrant may ﬁnd entry
proﬁtable. In this region, both ﬁrms would distribute additional output if they
had it, so if Firm C produces a small amount, it can sell its output at the market
price. However, entry is only proﬁtable if p > k. It follows that Firm C will enter
if xA < R(xB;0), xB < R(xA;0), and p(xA+xB) > k, that is, if xA and xB satisfy
condition 1 in Lemma 7 and are in Region A of Figures 4, 5, and 6. The third
constraint binds only when k is large, as shown in Figure 6.
16
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Vol. 7 [2007], Iss. 1 (Advances), Art. 19
http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/vol7/iss1/art19Figure 6: Regions in Which Entry Occurs: xs
k;0 < xc
0 and p(xc
0+xc
0) < k,
or k  1
3
In Region D1 of the ﬁgures, the larger ﬁrm (Firm A) acts like a zero-cost
Cournot competitor. In the distribution subgame, the larger ﬁrm distributes its
zero-cost best response to the (expected) distribution level of the smaller ﬁrm
(Firm B). In other words, the larger of the two ﬁrms is a zero-cost Stackelberg
follower. In the absence of entry, the smaller ﬁrm’s optimal output would be xs
k;0.
If it were to produce less than this amount, then its marginal valuation for the
entrant’s output would be greater than k, deeming entry proﬁtable. If the smaller
ﬁrm were to produce more than xc
0, then its maximal willingness to pay would
be less than k, and entry would be unproﬁtable. A similar reasoning applies to
Region D2 of the ﬁgures. These regions are also discussed in more detail in the
Appendix in the proof of Lemma 8.
7 Stage 1: Incumbents’ Production Decisions
We begin by considering the case in which the cost of capacity, k, is large. Specif-
ically, we suppose that costs are larger than 1=(2
p
2). In this case, entry is ac-
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the entrant’s output than produce enough output to deter entry.
Proposition 1 A pure-strategy, entry-accommodating, subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium of the form f¯ x; ¯ x;R(¯ x+ ¯ x;k)g, where ¯ x = r(¯ x), exists if and only
if k  :261. Under our assumption that demand is linear, the equilibrium
production is fxA;xB;xCg =
1 k
3 ; 1 k
3 ; 1 k
6
	
, and the market price is 1+5k
6 . No
other pure-strategy equilibrium exists in which entry is accommodated.
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 1 shows that when production costs are sufﬁciently large, an equi-
librium exists in which entry is accommodated. Moreover, if it exists, the entry-
accommodating equilibrium has the same output as the equilibrium output in
Market Structure III, in which the entrant has access to distribution, even though
the entrant must distribute its output through one of the incumbents. The incum-
bents accommodate entry, but as Stackelberg leaders they produce more than the
entrant.
We next consider the case in which the cost of capacity is very small. When
the marginal cost of production is less than 1/6, there is a symmetric, subgame-
perfect Nash equilibrium in which entry is deterred. Each incumbent produces
xc
0. Since neither incumbent values additional output, the negative externality is
eliminated. So, neither ﬁrm is willing to pay for Firm C’s output, and C will not
produce.
Proposition 2 A symmetric, pure-strategy, subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of
the form fxc
0;xc
0;0g where xc
0 = R(xc
0;0) exists if and only if k  1
6. Given linear
demand, xc
0 = 1
3, and the equilibrium production is
1
3; 1
3;0
	
. The incumbents sell
all that they produce, and entry is deterred.
Proof: See Appendix.
Figure 4 depicts the entrant’s decision when k  1
6. When costs are low,
the only point on the boundary of the shaded area at which entry is deterred is
fxc
0;xc
0;0g. And not surprisingly, this is the unique pure-strategy equilibrium.
When the cost is slightly larger than 1=6, then if each ﬁrm thought the other
was producing xc
0, they would each have a unilateral incentive to produce less
than xc
0. Although this deviation induces entry, the deviator is strictly better off.
This is because xs
k;0 < xc
0, and each ﬁrm realizes if they lower their output by e,
entry will occur, their rival will win the auction and distribute R(xc
0 e;0). Since
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the Stackelberg leader output. While there is no symmetric equilibrium in which
entryisdeterred, entrycanstillbedeterredinanon-cooperativeequilibriumwhen
the strategies of Firms A and B are asymmetric.
Proposition 3 Asymmetric, pure-strategy, subgame-perfect Nash equilibria of
the form fxs
k;0;R(xs
k;0;0);0g, or analogously, fR(xs
k;0;0);xs
k;0;0g exist if and only
if k 2

1
6; 1
2
p
2

. With linear demand, the equilibria are
1 2k
2 ; 1+2k
4 ;0
	
and
1+2k
4 ; 1 2k
2 ;0
	
.
Proof: See Appendix.
In the ﬁrst of the two equilibria in Proposition 3, Firm A produces the Stack-
elberg leader output and Firm B produces its best response, yet Firm A is the
smaller ﬁrm! This paradoxical result occurs because Firm A’s costs are k (cost
are relatively large in this case) while Firm B acts as if its costs were zero. Firm
C produces zero, and Firms A and B’s equilibrium sales are equal to their pro-
duction. Firm B deters entry and allows Firm A to free ride.13 However, in this
equilibrium, Firm B produces more than Firm A, so it earns strictly greater prof-
its. Each ﬁrm prefers the equilibrium in which it is the Stackelberg follower. Note
also that because Firm B produces more, it internalizes more of the beneﬁts of
entry deterrence.
Figure 5 characterizes the entrant’s decision for all xA and xB when k 2
 1
6; 1
3

,
which includes the region in which Proposition 3 holds and the asymmetric equi-
librium exists.
Proposition 4 proves that Propositions 1 through 3 characterize all of the pure-
strategy, subgame-perfect Nash equilibria of the game.
Proposition 4 The equilibrium described in Proposition 2 and the two equilibria
described in Proposition 3 are the unique entry-deterring equilibria of the game.
Proof: See Appendix.
This is easy to see intuitively. Suppose another equilibrium existed of the
form fx;R(x;0)g. First, note that this could only be an equilibrium if x <R(x;0).
In the proof, we show that if the smaller ﬁrm produces s = xe, the rival will
distribute R(s;0). Intuitively, if the smaller ﬁrm increases its output, the rival will
dispose of some of its output. And, if the smaller ﬁrm decreases its output, the
13Gilbert and Vives (1986) examine free riding in a multiple-incumbent entry deterrence model
in which the entrant has access to distribution.
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equilibrium is asymmetric, the smaller ﬁrm must be producing xs
k;0.
Propositions 1 though 4 are summarized in Figure 7. In particular, Figure 7
emphasizes that there exists a range of capacity costs for which the asymmetric
entry-deterring equilibrium (Proposition 3) and the entry-accommodating equi-
librium (Proposition 1) both exist.
Figure 7: Subgame-Perfect Equilibria as a Function of k
Finally, it is straightforward to analyze social welfare. For all k greater than
1=4, the output in the asymmetric entry-deterring equilibrium, xs
k;0+R(xs
k;0;0) =
1=2   k + (1=2 + k)=2 = (3   2k)=4, is greater than the output in the entry-
accommodating equilibrium, (5 5k)=6. This means that in the range of k in
which the asymmetric entry-deterring equilibrium and the entry-accommodating
equilibrium both exist, i.e., k 2
h
:261204;1=(2
p
2)
i
, welfare is higher when en-
try is deterred. Requiring the incumbents to distribute the entrant’s output would
lower welfare. Nevertheless, for k less than 1/4, entry deterrence reduces welfare
(relative to a requirement that A and B distribute the entrant’s output).
8 Conclusion
This paper has considered the plight of an entrant who faces two signiﬁcant chal-
lenges. First, the incumbent ﬁrms are vertically integrated and control the dis-
tribution channels. Second, the entrant has no obvious source of competitive
advantage; its costs are no lower than the incumbent ﬁrms’, and its product is no
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bents. After sinking irreversible investments, the entrant can take advantage of
a negative externality that exists between the incumbents. An incumbent’s will-
ingness to pay for the entrant’s output or capacity is higher when it believes that
the other incumbent is willing to acquire and distribute the entrant’s output, too.
We have showed that when the costs of production are low, the incumbents will
expand their production in anticipation of the auction and deter entry altogether.
When the costs of production are high, however, we showed that the entrant will
gain full access to the market and behave like a vertically integrated producer.
Our results are relevant to public policy debates. First, our results imply that
incumbents can generate signiﬁcant proﬁt increases through agreements not to
deal with entrants. Such agreements are already per se illegal. In the telecom-
munications industry, incumbents have historically been required to provide uni-
versal access to rival ﬁrms. Our results suggest that access requirements could
increase welfare when costs are small, but decrease welfare when costs are large.
This is because access requirements would cause the incumbents to stop engaging
in entry deterrence, which is socially preferred to entry.
Note, however, that we have assumed that the ﬁrms’ costs were symmetric.
We conjecture that even if the entrant had higher costs of production, when k is
sufﬁciently large the incumbents accommodate entry. This is important because
it suggests a potential efﬁciency defense for such agreements not to deal with
entrants.
In order to derive concrete results, we have made a number of simplifying
assumptions. First, we have assumed a single entrant. If there were more than
one entrant, then the incumbents would probably invest more in entry deterrence.
(The cost of entry is higher when the entrants produce more.) It is likely that
the range of costs for which entry-accommodating equilibria exist would shrink
and that the range of costs for which asymmetric entry-deterring equilibria exist
would grow. (The range of costs for which the symmetric entry-deterring equi-
libria exists stays the same.) Second, we assumed that the distribution costs were
zero. If the incumbents had positive marginal costs of distribution it would be
much easier to deter entry. More generally as the proportion of costs that are
sunk in the production stage decreases, the importance of the entrant’s commit-
ment declines. Third, we restricted attention to linear demand functions. This
assumption was made in order to calculate the proﬁt changes resulting from a
large deviations in output. This was particularly useful because our model has
discontinuous best response functions. Although we believe that many of the in-
sights and intuitions in the paper would generalize, a full analysis of the more
general case is beyond the scope of this project.
Some interesting extensions of the model have yet to be fully explored. For
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our insights are important for markets with differentiated products as well. In-
deed, many of the examples that we have used to motivate the paper have fea-
tured differentiated products. The indie movie “Hustle & Flow,” for example,
is unique in the sense that it is not a perfect substitute for other ﬁlms being pro-
duced in Hollywood. It may be, however, an imperfect substitute for other edgy,
urban, rap-oriented ﬁlms. In a differentiated products world, incumbents might
choose to preempt entry through product-line expansions rather than capacity
expansions. Indeed, these are the types of strategies the major motion picture
studios are employing.
Also, we have assumed that the two incumbents produced before the entrant
did. Anequallyreasonableassumptionwouldhavebeenthatalltheﬁrmsproduce
simultaneously. In this case, our earlier discussion regarding why the duopoly
output is not an equilibrium remains unchanged. If Firms A and B are ignoring
the threat of entry, Firm C’s best response is the same whether it moves simulta-
neously or subsequently. However, the entry-deterring equilibria we describe are
not equilibria of the simultaneous move game. If Firms A and B both believe that
Firm C will not enter, their best response is to produce the duopoly output.
We also could have allowed the entrant to produce ﬁrst. This might be rea-
sonable if the potential entrant were a new product innovator, but had to distribute
its product through existing ﬁrms, and existing ﬁrms could choose to imitate and
produce themselves. In this case, it also matters whether the incumbents buy the
entrant’s output before or after they produce. If they produce before the auction,
it is clear again that the incumbents cannot deter entry by producing the duopoly
output. If they produce after the auction, then it is clear that the entrant will pro-
duce at least the Stackelberg output since (even ignoring the externality created)
the entrant can sell the role of Stackelberg leader to the two ﬁrms. So, the duopoly
outcome is not an equilibrium outcome.
Finally, our ideas might apply to other vertical relationships such as licens-
ing and franchising. In the U.S. beer industry, the incumbent beer companies
control vast networks of independent beer distributors and maintain tight con-
trol through restrictive contracting practices. In the late 1990s, market leader
Anheuser-Busch was investigated for alleged antitrust violations for its exclusive
contracting practices, dubbed the “100% share of mind” contracts by Chairman
August Busch III.14 These contracting practices make it very difﬁcult for entrants
producing specialty beers (e.g., Sierra Nevada or Goose Island) to achieve mar-
ket penetration. These difﬁculties have become even greater as Anheuser-Busch
14The investigation was later abandoned. “Amid Probe, Anheuser Conquers Turf,” The Wall
Street Journal, March 9, 1988. Note that US beer makers also distribute many foreign beers, even
while introducing brands designed to compete head-to-head with these imports.
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alternatives to the independent brews. Our paper may, in part, explain Anheuser-
Busch’s product-line decisions.15
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3
As a follower, Firm C produces R(xA+xB;k). As a Stackelberg leader, Firm A
produces
argmax
xA
p(xA+xB+R(xA+xB;k)) kxA:
Similarly, Firm B produces
argmax
xB
p(xA+xB+R(xA+xB;k)) kxB:
For linear demand, Firm i’s ﬁrst order condition, i 2 fA;Bg, is
1 2xi x i+k
2
 k = 0:
So, xA = xB = (1 k)

3, and xC = R
 
2(1 k)

3;k

= (1 k)

6. The industry
output is xA+xB+xC = 5(1 k)

6, and the market price is p = (1+k)

6. 
Proof of Lemma 6
Without loss of generality, suppose xA  xB. Firm A’s valuation for entrant’s
output, xC, is
PA(zA(xA+xC;xB);zB(xA+xC;xB))
 PA(zA(xA;xB+xC);zB(xA;xB+xC));
the total revenue earned if it acquires the entrant’s output, less the total revenue
earned if its rival acquires the entrant’s output. Similarly, Firm B’s willingness to
pay is
PB(zA(xA;xB+xC);zB(xA;xB+xC))
 PB(zA(xA+xC;xB);zB(xA+xC;xB)):
15Our analysis applies in that Anheuser-Busch’s relationships with its distributors are analo-
gous to vertical integration, and product proliferation is analogous to capacity expansion.
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are weakly higher when Firm A acquires xC than when Firm B acquires xC:
PA(zA(xA+xC;xB);zB(xA+xC;xB))
+PB(zA(xA+xC;xB);zB(xA+xC;xB))
 PA(zA(xA;xB+xC);zB(xA;xB+xC))
+PB(zA(xA;xB+xC);zB(xA;xB+xC))
We can rewrite this expression as:
xC Z
0

¶PA(zA(xA+s;xB);zB(xA+s;xB))
¶xA
+
¶PB(zA(xA+s;xB);zB(xA+s;xB))
¶xA

ds

xC Z
0

¶PA(zA(xA;xB+s);zB(xA;xB+s))
¶xB
+
¶PB(zA(xA;xB+s);zB(xA;xB+s))
¶xB

ds
and a sufﬁcient condition for this to be true is that:
(3)
¶PA(zA(xA+s;xB);zB(xA+s;xB))
¶xA
+
¶PB(zA(xA+s;xB);zB(xA+s;xB))
¶xA

¶PA(zA(xA;xB+s);zB(xA;xB+s))
¶xB
+
¶PB(zA(xA;xB+s);zB(xA;xB+s))
¶xB
for all s.
Sincex+R(x;0)isincreasinginx, itfollowsthatxA+R(xA;0)xB+R(xB;0)
and R(xB;0) xA  R(xA;0) xB. We show that (3) holds for all s by considering
the following three cases separately: 1) R(xB;0) xA  R(xA;0) xB < s; 2)
s < R(xB;0) xA  R(xA;0) xB; and 3) R(xB;0) xA  s  R(xA;0) xB.
Case 1. Suppose that R(xB;0) xA  R(xA;0) xB < s. Then ¶zA

¶xA =
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¶xB = 0 so
¶PA(zA(xA+s;xB);zB(xA+s;xB))
¶xA
+
¶PB(zA(xA+s;xB);zB(xA+s;xB))
¶xA
= 0
and
¶PA(zA(xA;xB+s);zB(xA;xB+s))
¶xB
+
¶PB(zA(xA;xB+s);zB(xA;xB+s))
¶xB
= 0:
Hence, both sides of (3) are zero, and the inequality holds.
Case 2. Next, suppose that s < R(xB;0) xA  R(xA;0) xB. Then
¶PA(zA(xA+s;xB);zB(xA+s;xB))
¶xA
+
¶PB(zA(xA+s;xB);zB(xA+s;xB))
¶xA
= (xA+xB+s)p(xA+xB+s)
and
¶PA(zA(xA;xB+s);zB(xA;xB+s))
¶xB
+
¶PB(zA(xA;xB+s);zB(xA;xB+s))
¶xB
= (xA+xB+s)p(xA+xB+s)
so, both sides of (3) are equal.
Case3. Finally, supposeR(xB;0) xA sR(xA;0) xB. ThenzB(xA+s;xB)
= xB and zA(xA+s;xB) = R(xB;0), so the left-hand side of (3) is zero: Firm A
woulddistributes, butFirmB,ontheotherhandwouldnot. Also, zB(xA;xB+s)=
xB+s and zA(xA;xB+s) = R(xB+s;0), so, the right-hand side of (3) is:
dPA(R(xB+s;0);xB+s)
dxB
+
dPB(R(xB+s;0);xB+s)
dxB
=
d(R(xB+s;0)+xB+s)p(R(xB+s;0)+xB+s)
dxB
< 0
This must be negative since R(xB+s;0)+xB+s > R(0;0) (because x+R(x;0)
is increasing in x) and xp(x) is maximized at R(0;0), so (3) holds. 
25
Dana and Spier: Entry Deterrence in a Duopoly Market
Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007Lemma 8 We assume xA  xB and let the reader infer analogous results for the
case when xB > xA. Recall that Firm C’s proﬁts are equal to the difference be-
tween Firm B’s proﬁts if it acquires the output, and Firm B’s proﬁts if Firm A
acquires the output, less Firm C’s costs.
First, consider (xA;xB) such that xA < R(xB;0) and xB < R(xA;0). Firm C’s
proﬁts are:
1) (xB+xC)p(xA+xB+xC) xBp(xA+xB+xC) xCk, which is equivalent
to xCp(xA+xB+xC) xck, when it produces xC  R(xB;0) xA (“interval A-
1”);
2) (xB+xC)p(xA+xB+xC) xBp(xB+R(xB;0)) xCk when its production
is R(xB;0) xA < xC < R(xA;0) xB (“interval A-2”);
3)R(xA;0)p(xA+R(xA;0)) xBp(xB+R(xB;0)) xCk whenitproducesxC >
R(xA;0) xB (“interval A-3”).
Next, consider (xA;xB) such that xA  R(xB;0) and xB < xc
0. Firm C’s proﬁts
are:
1)(xB+xC)p(R(xB+xC)+xB+xC) xBp(R(xB;0)+xB) xCk whenitpro-
duces xC  xc
0 xB (“interval DA -1”);
2) xc
0p
 
2xc
0

 xBp(R(xB;0)+xB) xCk if xC > xc
0 xB (“interval DA -2”).
Finally, consider (xA;xB) such that xA > xc
0 and xB > xc
0. Firm C’s proﬁts are:
1) xc
0p
 
xc
0+xc
0

 xc
0p
 
xc
0+xc
0

 xCk =  xCk < 0 for all xC.
Remarks A through C: Necessary and Sufﬁcient Conditions for Entry:
A) When xA < R(xB;0) and xB < R(xA;0), Firm C’s proﬁt is strictly in-
creasing in xC when evaluated at xC = 0, so Firm C will enter if and only if
p(xA+xB) > k.
B) When xA  R(xB;0) Firm C will enter if and only if xB < xs
k;0.
Proof: First, note that the derivative of Firm C’s proﬁt when evaluated at
xC = 0,
xBp0(R(xB;0)+xB)

¶R(xB;0)
¶x
+1

+ p(R(xB;0)+xB) k
is positive if and only if xB < xs
k;0 since xs
k;0 maximizes xBp(R(xB;0)+xB) kxB.
So entry will occur if xA  R(xB;0) and xB < xs
k;0. Next, note that when xA 
R(xB;0) and xB > xs
k;0 Firm C’s proﬁts are strictly decreasing in xC, so entry will
not occur.
C) When xA > xc
0 and xB > xc
0 Firm C’s proﬁts are strictly negative for all
xC > 0, so Firm C will not enter.
Remarks 1 through 7: Firm C’s Optimal Production when xA < R(xB;0) and
xB < R(xA;0)
1) If xA = xB then R(xA;0) xB = R(xB;0) xA interval A-2 vanishes.
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(xB+xC)p(xA+xB+xC) xBp(xB+R(xB;0)) xCk
= xCp(xA+xB+xC)+xB(p(xA+xB+xC)  p(xB+R(xB;0))) xCk
 xCp(xA+xB+xC) xCk:
3) Firm C’s proﬁt function is continuous in xC.
4) Firm C will never produce xC > maxfR(xA;0) xB;R(xB;0) xAg. Its
proﬁt at xC = maxfR(xA;0) xB;R(xB;0) xAg is strictly higher.
5) If R(xA+xB;k)  R(xB;0) xA then Firm C’s optimal production is x
C =
R(xA+xB;k).
Proof: By Remark 4, x
C is in A-1 or A-2. By Remark 2, the maximal proﬁt
in A-2 is less xCp(xA+xB+xC) xCk. But since R(xA+xB;k)  R(xB;0) xA,
the maximal proﬁt Interval A-1 is larger than the maximal proﬁt in interval A-2.
6) If R(xA+xB;k)R(xB;0) xA, then Firm C’s optimal production satisﬁes
x
C  R(xB;0) xA. More precisely, Firm C’s optimal production is the larger of
xC = R(xA;k) xB and xC = R(xB;0) xA.
Proof: First, we ﬁnd the unconstrained optimal production when Firm C’s
proﬁts function is (xB+xC)p(xA+xB+xC) xBp(xB+R(xB;0)) xCk (Interval
A-2). Using a change of variables, xBC =xB+xC, it is easy to see that the solution
is xBC =R(xA;k), so its proﬁt is maximized at xC =R(xA;k) xB. However, if the
constraint, R(xB;0) xA < xC < R(xA;0) xB, is binding, i.e., R(xA;k) xB 
R(xB;0) xA , then Firm C’s proﬁts are maximized at xC = R(xB;0) xA.
7) From Remarks 4 and 6, it follows that when xA = xB, then
x
C 2 fR(xA+xB;k);R(xA) xBg. 
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof of Existence: Consider a deviation by Firm C. By Lemma 8, Remark 7,
since xA =xB =(1 k)

3, R(xB;0) xA =R(xA;0) xB and Firm C will produce
R(xA+xB;k) if R(xA+xB;k)  R(xB;0) xA and R(xB;0) xA otherwise. So,
Firm C’s optimal production is
x
C =

R(xA+xB;k) = (1 k)=6 if k  1
4
R(xB;0) xA = k=2 if k < 1
4
In particular, when k > 1

4, Firm C has no proﬁtable deviation.
Now, consider Firm A’s production (or equivalently Firm B):
Claim: GivenxB =(1 k)

3, FirmA’soptimalproductioniseitherr(xB;k)=
(1 k)

3 or R(xB;0).
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A < (1 k)=3. Firm C will produce xC =
R(x
A+xB;k) because R(x
A+xB;k)<R(x
A;0) xB. Furthermore, linear demand
together with R(xA+xB;k) < R(xA;0) xB at xA = xB = (1 k)=3 imply that
R(xA+xB;k) < R(xA;0) xB for all xA < (1 k)=3. So, Firm A’s proﬁt function
is xAp(xA+xB+R(xA+xB;k)) kxA, but this implies that Firm A’s proﬁts are
strictly increasing in xA for all xA < (1 k)=3, which is a contradiction. Sup-
pose that x
A > (1 k)

3 and R(x
A+xB;k) > R(xB;0) x
A. Suppose further that
x
A > R(xB;0) > xc
0. Then, by Lemma 8, Firm C’s proﬁt is independent of xA. If
xC  xc
0 xB, then Firm C’s proﬁt is
(xB+xC)p(R(xB+xC;0)+xB+xC) xBp(R(xB;0)+xB);
and if xC > xc
0 xB, then Firm C’s proﬁt is
xc
0p(R(xc
0;0)+xc
0) xBp(R(xB;0)+xB):
Since this is what Firm A will pay for Firm C’s output, Firm A earns strictly
greater proﬁt (because its costs are lower) when x
A = R(xB;0). This is a contra-
diction.
Suppose, as before, that x
A > (1 k)

3 and R(x
A+xB;k) > R(xB;0) x
A,
but now suppose that x
A < R(xB;0). By Lemma 6, since x
A > xB, Firm A will
buy Firm C’s output for Firm B’s valuation. Since Firm B values Firm C’s output
at
(xB+xC)p(R(xB;0)+xB) xBp(R(xB;0)+xB) = xCp(R(xB;0)+xB)
when xC = R(xB;0) x
A and p(R(xB;0)+xB) > k, it is clear that Firm B’s val-
ues Firm C’s optimal output strictly greater than kxC. So, Firm A’s proﬁt, if it
produces x
A < R(xB;0), is strictly less than
R(xB;0)p(xB+R(xB;0)) (xA+xC)k:
However, if Firm A produces x
A = R(xB;0), then by Lemma 8, Remark 6,
x
C = maxfR(xB;0) xA;R(xA;k) xBg;
but since R(xB;0) x
A = 0 and
R(x
A;k) xB =
1 x
A k
2
 
1
3
(1 k)
=
1 R(xB;0) k
2
 
1
3
(1 k)
=
1  1
3  k
2
 
1
3
(1 k) =  
k
6
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C = 0, so if Firm A produce x
A = R(xB;0) its proﬁts are
R(xB;0)p(xB+R(xB;0)) R(xB;0)k:
Firm A’s proﬁts are strictly higher if it produces x
A = R(xB;0). We conclude
that Firm A’s optimal production is either r(xB;k) = (1 k)

3 or R(xB;0). So,
we only need to consider a deviation to R(xB;0) to determine whether or not
(1 k)

3 is Firm A’s optimal strategy. Firm A’s equilibrium proﬁts are
1
3
(1 k)

1 
5
6
(1 k) k

=
1
18
(1 k)
2 =
1
18
 
1
9
k+
1
18
k2;
and, since x
C = R(xB;0) xA = 0, Firm A’s proﬁts at R(xB;0) are
1
3
(1+k)

1 
1
3
(1 k) 
1
3
(1+k) k

=
1
3
(1+k)

1
3
 k

=
1
9
 
2
9
k 
1
3
k2
So Firm A will want to deviate to R(xB;0) if and only if
1
9
 
2
9
k 
1
3
k2 >
1
18
 
1
9
k+
1
18
k2
or 2 4k 6k2 > 1 2k+k2 ; 1 2k 7k2 > 0 ; k < :261204.
Proof of Uniqueness:
Finally, we show that no other entry-accommodating equilibria exists. Sup-
pose fxA;xB;xCg is an entry-accommodating equilibrium, so xC > 0.
Weﬁrstclaimthatinanyentry-accommodatingequilibriumbothxA <R(xB;0)
and xB <R(xA;0). Suppose instead that an entry-accommodating equilibrium ex-
ists in which xA  R(xB;0) (or, by analogy, that xB  R(xA;0)). Then, by Lemma
8, Firm C will enter only if xB < xs
k;0. But if xB < xs
k;0, Firm B could increase its
proﬁts by producing more.
We next claim that in any entry-accommodating equilibrium
xC = R(xA+xB;k)  minfR(xA;0) xB;R(xB;0) xAg:
SupposeinsteadthatxC R(xB;0) xA andxA xB (orbyanalogyxC R(xA;0) 
xB and xB  xA). Since Firm A will buy Firm C’s output, the equilibrium of
the distribution game will be R(xB;0) and xB. If xB < xs
k;0, Firm B could in-
crease its proﬁts by producing xs
k;0, so xB  xs
k;0. However, this implies that if
Firm A deviated to xA = R(xB;0), entry would be deterred, and Firm A would
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higher, but it saves at least as much as it would have paid Firm C if Firm C pro-
duced xC = R(xA;0) xB, which is Firm B’s valuation for xC = R(xA;0) xB:
(xB+R(xB;0) xA)p(xA+xB+R(xB;0) xA) xBp(R(xB;0)+xB)
= (R(xB;0) xA)p(xB+R(xB;0)):
So, in every entry-accommodating equilibria it must be that xC =R(xA+xB;k)
minfR(xA;0) xB;R(xB;0) xAg
Therefore, since Firm C produces xC = R(xA+xB;k), Firm A maximizes its
proﬁts by choosing xA = r(xB), and Firm B maximizes its proﬁts by choosing
xB = r(xA). So, the unique, entry-accommodating equilibrium is
fxA;xB;xCg =

1 k
3
;
1 k
3
;
1 k
6

. 
Proof of Proposition 2
We will demonstrate that no ﬁrm has a proﬁtable deviation when k  1

6 and at
least one ﬁrm does when k > 1

6.
First, consider Firm C. By Lemma 8 (Remark C), if xA  xc
0 and xB  xc
0, then
Firm C’s best response is xC = 0, so in particular xC = 0 is its best response to
xA = xB = xc
0.
Next, consider Firm A (and by analogy Firm B). Neither Firm A nor Firm B
has an incentive to produce more than xc
0. By Lemma 8, such a deviation would
have no effect on Firm C, and by Lemma 5 it would have no effect on their
revenues in the distribution game, but it would increase their costs but not their
revenues. Suppose Firm A (and by analogy Firm B) could increase its proﬁt by
producing xA < xB = xc
0. By Lemma 8, as long as p
 
xA+xc
0

> k, which follows
from k  1

6, Firm C can proﬁtably produce.
Claim: IfxA <xB =xc
0 andk<1

3, thenFirmC’soptimalproductionsatisﬁes
xC  R(xA;0) xc
0 > 0.
Proof of Claim: By Lemma 8, Remark 5, Firm C will produce R(xA+xB;k) if
R(xA+xB;k)<R(xB;0) xA and xC R(xA;0) xB otherwise. So, it is sufﬁcient
to show that R(xA+xB;k) > R(xB;0) xA. Since
R(xA+xB;k) = argmax
xC
xCp(xA+xB+xC) xCk;
it follows that when xB = xc
0 = 1

3 and demand is linear, then R(xA+xB;k) =
1

3 xA

2 k

2. Also R(xA;0) xB = 1

2 xA

2 1

3 = 1

6 xA

2. So,
R(xA+xB;k) > R(xB;0) xA when k < 1

3.
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(by the previous claim), Firm B will distribute only R(xA;0). So, when Firm A
deviates to any xA < xc
0, Firm A’s proﬁts will be xAp(xA +R(xA;0)) kxA. The
optimal deviation for Firm A solves
max
xA
xAp(xA+R(xA;0)) kxA
subject to xA < xc
0. For linear demand, the unconstrained solution to this problem
is xA = xs
k;0 = 1

2 k. So, for k  1=6, xA  1

3 no proﬁtable deviation exists,
but for k > 1=6, Firm A can increase its proﬁts by producing xA = 1

2 k. 
Proof of Proposition 3
To prove that fxs
k;0;R(xs
k;0;0);0g (and by analogy fR(xs
k;0;0);xs
k;0;0g) is an equi-
librium if and only if k 2 (1=6;1=(2
p
2)] we must show that no proﬁtable devia-
tion exists for any player when k 2 (1=6;1=(2
p
2)] and that a proﬁtable deviation
does exist when k = 2 (1=6;1=(2
p
2)] .
Suppose k < 1=6, so xs
k;0 > R(xs
k;0;0). It is clear from Lemma 8 that entry
is deterred. In the distribution stage, Firm B will distribute all of its production,
R(xs
k;0;0), but Firm A will distribute only R(R(xs
k;0;0);0). If Firm A deviates
and produces R(R(xs
k;0;0);0), entry is still deterred, and distribution remains the
same, but Firm A’s costs are lower. So, fxs
k;0;R(xs
k;0;0);0g is not an equilibrium
when k < 1=6. It follows that xs
k;0  R(xs
k;0;0).
First, consider possible deviations from equilibrium by Firm C. By Lemma 8,
Remark C, it is clear that Firm C will not produce.
Second, consider possible deviations from equilibrium by Firm A. First, sup-
pose Firm A deviates by producing more than xs
k;0. Then, by Lemma 8, Firm C
will still produce nothing.
If xA < xc
0 (Firm A’s deviation is not too large), then in the distribution stage
Firm A will distribute xA, and Firm B will withhold some of its output and dis-
tribute R(xA;0) < R(xs
k;0;0). So, the optimal deviation for Firm A maximizes
xAp(xA+R(xA;0)) kxA subject to xA < xc
0. But the solution to this problem is
xs
k;0 if k > 1

6.
If Firm A’s deviation is large, so xA > xc
0, then both ﬁrms will distribute
xc
0. Firm A’s proﬁts are no more than xc
0p
 
xc
0+xc
0

 kxc
0, which is less than
xs
k;0p(xs
k;0 +R(xs
k;0;0)) kxs
k;0 for k > 1

6. So, an increase in Firm A’s produc-
tion is never proﬁtable.
Now, suppose that Firm A deviates by producing less than xs
k;0.
Claim: If xA < xs
k;0, xB = R(xs
k;0;0), and k < 1

2 then Firm C’s optimal pro-
duction satisﬁes xC  R(xA;0) xB > 0.
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if R(xA+xB;k) < R(xB;0) xA, and xC  R(xA;0) xB otherwise. So, it is sufﬁ-
cient to show that R(xA+xB;k) > R(xB;0) xA. Recall that
R(xA+xB;k) = argmax
xC
xCp(xA+xB+xC) xCk:
Using linear demand, and substituting both xs
k;0 = 1=2 k and xB = R(xs
k;0;0) =
(1+2k)

4 into the objective function, this optimization yields R(xA+xB;k) =
3

8 xA

2 3k

4. AlsousinglineardemandandxB =xc
0 =1

3, R(xA;0) xB =
1

2 xA

2 (1+2k)

4 = 1

4 xA

2+k

2, so R(xA+xB;k) > R(xB;0) xA
when k < 1

2.
Since xA < xB, Firm B will acquire xC. Since xB +xC = xc
0 +xC  R(xA;0)
(by the previous claim), Firm B will distribute only R(xA;0). So, when Firm A
deviates to any xA < xc
0, Firm A’s proﬁts will be xAp(xA+R(xA;0)) kxA. So, the
most proﬁtable deviation for Firm A is xA = argmaxxAxAp(xA+R(xA;0)) kxA
which is equal to xs
k;0.
So, no proﬁtable deviation exists for Firm A.
Finally, consider possible deviations from equilibrium by Firm B. Clearly,
FirmBcannotincreaseitsproﬁtbyproducingmorethanR(xs
k;0;0): FirmCwould
still produce zero. So, Firm B would be earning the same revenue at higher cost.
Suppose Firm B produced less than R(xs
k;0;0).
Claim: If xA = xs
k;0 then Firm C’s best response to xB = 1

4 is R(xB+xs
k;0;k)
if and only k  1

4.
Proof: Given that Firm B deviates to xB = 1=4, so xB  xA = xs
k;0 = 1

2 k,
byLemma8, Remark6, FirmC’sbestresponseisR(xA+xB;k)ifR(xA+xB;k)<
R(xA;0) xB and xC  R(xA;0) xB otherwise. Since Firm A produces xs
k;0 =
1

2 k and Firm B produces 1

4,
R(xA+xB;k) =
1  1
4  
 1
2  k

 k
2
=
1
8
;
and
R(xA;0) xB =
1 
 1
2  k

2
 
1
4
=
k
2
;
so then Firm C’s best response is R(xA+xB;k) if and only if k  1

4.
Consider Firm B’s proﬁts when it chooses some deviation xB < R(xs
k;0;0)
to which Firm C’s best response is xC = R(xA+xB;k). Firm B’s proﬁts from
such a deviation are xBp(xB+xs
k;0+R(xB+xs
k;0;k)), which is clearly less than
maxxBxBp(xB+xs
k;0+R(xB+xs
k;0;k)). For linear demand, this upper bound is
max
xB
xB
1 xs
k;0 xB k
2

;
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4 where Firm B’s proﬁts are
xB
1
2

1
2
 xB

=
1
32
:
But by the claim xC = R(xA+xB;k) is Firm C’s best response to xC = 1

4 when
k > 1=4. So, Firm B’s most proﬁtable deviation is xB = 1

4 and its proﬁts from
that deviation are 1

32. However, there are also deviations to which Firm C’s
optimal response satisﬁes xC  R(xs
k;0;0) xB, and we must also show that these
do not earn higher proﬁts.
Suppose Firm C’s optimal response to a deviation by Firm B satisﬁes xC 
R(xs
k;0;0) xB. If xB 2 [xs
k;0;R(xs
k;0;0)) then Firm B will acquire Firm C’s output
in the auction (because it is larger) and then distribute R(xs
k;0;0) in the distribution
stage. Firm B distributes the same amount as when it produces the equilibrium
output, R(xs
k;0;0), and so earns the same revenue, but its costs are strictly higher
(because it pays Firm C more than k for that output). If xB 2 [0;xs
k;0], then Firm A
will withhold some output in Stage 4 and distribute R(xB;0). An upper bound for
Firm B’s payoff from a deviation satisfying xB 2 [0;xs
k;0] is the proﬁt that solves
max
xB
xBp(xB+R(xB;0)) kxB;
subject to xB 2 [0;xs
k;0]. The upper bound of this expression is achieved at xB =
1=2 k (notice that xB = xs
k;0, so the constraint is not binding). Firm B’s prof-
its from this deviation are (1=2)[1=2 k]2. But Firm B’s equilibrium proﬁts are
(1=4)[1=2 k][1=2+k]. It that Firm B will not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to deviate when-
ever k > 1=6. Therefore, Firm B will deviate to xB = 1

4 if and only if 1

32 is
greater than its equilibrium proﬁts, 1

4
 
1

4 k2
, or k > 1=(2
p
2). 
Proof of Proposition 4
From Lemma 8, entry is deterred only if either xA  R(xB;0), xB  R(xA;0)
or p(xA+xB)  k. However, when p(xA+xB)  k, Firms A and B cannot be
producing optimally since proﬁts are zero or negative for both ﬁrms. Also note
that xA > R(xB;0) and xB > R(xA;0) are inconsistent with proﬁt maximization
since production could be reduced without changing distribution or revenues. So,
in any pure strategy, entry-deterring equilibrium either xA = R(xB;0) or xB =
R(xA;0) must hold. So, all the candidates for an equilibrium are of the form
f˙ x;R(˙ x;0);0g where ˙ x < R(˙ x;0) or equivalently, ˙ x < xc
0. Graphically, since
xA  R(xB;0) and xB  R(xA;0), the equilibrium candidates lie on the portion
of the ﬁrm’s zero-cost reaction functions that are on the boundary of Region A in
Figures 4, 5, and 6.
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
6. Suppose there exists an equilibrium f˙ x;R(˙ x;0);0g where
˙ x < xc
0, that is, an equilibrium different from the equilibrium in Proposition 2.
Note that xAp(xA +R(xA;0)) kxA is concave and for k  1

6, we have xc
0 
argmaxxAxAp(xA+R(xA;0)) kxA (see proof of Proposition 2). If Firm A devi-
ates to xc
0, Firm B will distribute only R
 
xc
0;0

so Firm A’s proﬁts are xc
0p(xc
0+
R(xc
0;0)) kxc
0, which must be higher. So, no such equilibrium exists.
Consider k > 1

6. Suppose there exists an equilibrium f˙ x;R(˙ x;0);0g where
˙ x 6= argmaxxAxAp(xA +R(xA;0)) kxA, so it is different from the equilibrium
in Proposition 3. If ˙ x < argmaxxAxAp(xA +R(xA;0)) kxA Firm A can deviate
to xs
k;0 and earn strictly higher proﬁt since Firm B will distribute R(xs
k;0;0). If
˙ x > argmaxxAxAp(xA +R(xA;0)) kxA then Firm A can deviate to xs
k;0, which
will induce entry, and Firm B will again distribute R(xs
k;0;0), so Firm A is better
off. So, no such equilibrium exists.
The same argument holds for an equilibrium of the form fR(˙ x;0); ˙ x;0g. So,
theonlycandidatesforanequilibriumarefxs
k;0;R(xs
k;0;0);0gandfR(xs
k;0;0);xs
k;0;0g,
where xs
k;0 = argmaxxAxAp(xA+R(xA;0)) kxA, and we showed in Proposition
3 that these candidate equilibria exist if and only if k 2 (1=6;1=(2
p
2)]. 
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